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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
0. K. CLA 1, Ad1ninistrator of the
Estate of AHNOLD I~ARTCHNER,
also known as ARNOLD G.
KARTCHNER, also known as
ARNOLD GRANT KARTCHNER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No. 7705

STEPHEN L. DUNFORD, PAUL
H. STEVENS, BURNS L. DUNFORD and L. CLAYTON DUNFORD, doing business as THE
DUNFORD BREAD COMPANY,
Defendants and Respondents. ;

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts set forth in the appellant's
brief does not fully reflect all of the material facts of
the case, and particularly those upon which the theory of
defense was based, and for that reason we deem it necessary to supplement the statement with the following:
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As stated in the appellant's brief, this is a wrongful
death case commenced by the personal representativE
of Arnold D. Kartchner, deceased, against the defendants as co-partners. The deceased suffered fatal injuries in an automobile accident occurring at about 316
East 13th South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, at about
4 :50 P.M. on the afternoon of June 24, 1950. There is
little or no dispute in the testimony of the witnesses, and
such differences as to the facts as there are between the
two parties are largely differences in the inferences to
be drawn from the established facts.
Immediately prior to the accident the deceased had
parked his station wagon automobile on the south side
of 13th South Street, facing in an easterly direction and
in front of the above mentioned address. (R. 104.) Deceased stepped from the left hand side of his automobile
and was immediately_ struck by a delivery truck owned
by the defendants and operated by Montel Mangum, defendant's employee. (R. 105, 107, 108.) It was admitted
in the pleadings that the truck was owned by the defendants, that the driver, Mangum, was an employee of the
defendants, and was engaged in the course of his employment at the time the accident occurred. (R. 1, 4.) Immedia:tely prior to the accident Mangum had made his
last delivery of the day at Jack Milner's Grocery Store,
203 Hampton Avenue. At the time· of the occurrence of
the accident, Mangum was returning to his employers'
place of business after having completed his last call.
(R. 170, 171.) After leaving Milner's Grocery, Mangum
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proceeded easterly on Hampton Avenue to 3rd East
Street and then turned right and proceeded southerly
along 3rd East to its intersection at 13th South Street.
(R. 171.) He stopped at the stop sign and waited for
traffic on 13th South Street to clear and then made a
left hand turn onto 13th South Street. Because traffic
was son1ewhat heavy at the time, Mr. :Mangum made a
rather wide turn so that his truck went over the southerly
edge of the hard surface portion of the road and on to the
dirt or gravel shoulder. (R. 171.) After completing this
turn, Mangum proceeded easterly along 13th South Street
to the point of collision which was some 167 feet east of
the east curb line of 3rd East Street. (R. 67.) As :Mangum
proceeded easterly along 13th South Street, he was looking straight ahead along his direction of travel. He
observed the station wagon automobile parked along the
south side of the road, but he did not at any time see the
deceased. (R. 171, 172.) According to his own testimony
he was going about twenty miles per hour (R. 179.)
Roberg testified that the truck was traveling "pretty
slow." (R. 106.) There is no evidence in the record to
the contrary. As he passed the station wagon he heard
a thud on the right side of his truck and he thought that
possibly "some kid" had thrown something at the truck.
On stopping to investigate, he saw the deceased lying in
the road. (R. 123.)
The plaintiff's theory at the trial of the· case was that
defendants' driver failed to keep a proper lookout; that
the deceased was standing by the station wagon auto-
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mobile as the defendants' driver approached the scene
of the accident, but that Mangum failed to observe the
deceased and negligently ran into him.
It was and is the defendants' theory that the deceased stepped suddenly from his station wagon and
directly into the defendants' truck; that there was no
opportunity whatsoever for Mangum to avoid the accident, and that the deceased failed to observe oncoming
traffic or to take any precautions whatsoever for his
own safety. Moreover, the deceased stepped from the
left hand E,ide of his automobile directly into the street
and the hazards of approaching traffic, when he could
have, with equal convenience and much greater safety,
alighted on the right side of his vehicle to the sidewalk,
and free of vehicular traffic hazards. The case was submitted to the jury on the question of the defendants'
negligence and deceased's contributory negligence and
assumption of risk, and the jury returned a verdict in
favor of the defendants, no cause of action.
There are some statements in the appellant's brief,
to the effect that the evidence conclusively shows negligence on the part of Mangum. To these statements we
take exception. There is abundant evidence in the record
to justify a finding of non-negligence upon the part of
Mangum. Besides the testimony of Mangum above set
forth, there is considerable corroborating testimony as
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to the truth and accuraey of his Yl'rsion of the accident.
Indeed there is no evidence to tl1e contrary except the
impeaching testin1ony of l\[rs. Roberg.
Officer Harold Peterson of the ~alt Lake Poliee
Force, one of the officers who investigated the accident,
testified that the truck left track marks along the south
shoulder of 13th South Street and that these track n1arks
were gradually moving from the shoulder of the road
back toward the center of the road at the point of.impact.
( R. 70.) This is corroborative of Mangum's testimony
that he made a wide turn.
The plaintiff introduced in evidence at the trial, some
photographs taken by Officer Snell immediately after the
accident, including pictures of the front and right side
of the defendants' truck. (Ex. B & D.) Exhibit B is a
view of the right side of the defendants' truck, and it
shows an indentation on the right hand door post about
three feet back from the front of the truck and about
five feet nine inches high. Near this indentation were
some colored marks which appeared to be blood spots.
(R. 47, 48, 54, 55, 63, 72, 73, 87.) There are other marks,
assumed to be blood spots, lower down on the same door
post. (R. 48.)
Exhibit D, which is a front view of the defendants'
truck shows no marks of any kind. (R. 54, 73, 86.) The
investigating officers examined the front of the truck
and found no marks or indentations of any kind.
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The testimony of Keith Roberg, is also illuminating.
Roberg testified that immediately prior to the accident,
he was engaged in conversation with the deceased. Roberg was standing on the right hand side of the station
wagon. His testimony as to what then transpired is as
follows:
happened~

"Q.

And then what

"A.

And then as he got out he got hit.

"Q.

When he got out what did he

"A.

He just closed the door and got hit." (R. 105.)
(Italics ours.)

do~

His testimony was to the same effect on cross examination:

"Q.

And just as he got out he got hit, ts that
right~

"A.

Yes." ( R. 108.) (Italics ours.)

From the testimony of Roberg that the deceased was
struck immediately upon his alighting from his automobile, together with the undisputed evidence that the
impact was upon the side ra;ther than on the front of the
truck, and the undisputed evidence that at the point of
impact the truck was moving away from the station
wagon and toward the center of the road, plus the testimony of Mangum that although he was looking straight
up the street and he observed the station wagon automobile but never observed the deceased, we believe that
the conclusion is irresistible that the deceased stepped
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suddenly and without looking, directly in the defendants'
truck; that the defendant's driver had no opportunity
to avoid the accident and that the deceased himself was
guilty of negligence which was the sole cause of his fatal
injuries. No other explanation can be reconciled with the
facts, most of which are undisputed.
POINTS TO BE ARGUED
POINT I.
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO.7.

POINT II.
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 10.

POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING TO THE
JURY THE QUESTION OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK ON
THE PART OF THE DECEASED.

POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO GIVE
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 3, EITHER
IN THE LANGUAGE REQUESTED OR IN MODIFIED FORM.

POINT V.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A DlRECTED VERDICT.
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ARGUMENT
As we unde~rstand the appellant's argument, there
is no contention n1ade that the evidence is not :;;ufficient
to support the verdict. If we understand his position correctly, appellant's only contention is that the Court committed error in its instructions to the jury. It is respondents' theory that there was no error committed by the
Court in instructing the jury and further, if there were
any error, such error would be immaterial, because the
defendants were entitled to a directed verdict on the
evidence adduced.
POINT I.
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO.7.

Appellant first complains that the Court erred in
giving its Instruction No. 7, which is as follows:
"You are instructed that a person cannot
deliberately incur an obvious risk of personal injury, particularly when there is a safe course of
action open to him, and then hold the author of
the danger liable in damages for any injuries sustained.
"If you find from the evidence in this case,
that the deceased, Arnold Kartchner, placed himself in a position of obvious peril when there was
no reasonable justification therefor, then the
said Arnold Kartchner is deemed to have assumed
the risk of his course of conduct and your verdict
must be in favor of the defendants and against
the plaintiff, no cause of action."
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It is not altogether clear upon what theory appellant
attack~ this instruction. Fnder Point I of his argtunent
he apparently treats the instruction as one on contributory negligence and ~eem~ to argue first, that there was
no evidence sufficient to warrant the giving of the instruction, and secondly, that the instruction did not correctly define the standard of care imposed upon the deceased. ll nder Point III of his argu1nent, appellant
see1ns to treat the instruction as one on the doctrine of
assumption of risk. \Ve believe that it was the intention
of the Court in giving Instruction No. 7, to charge the
jury on the defense of assumption of risk. The jury were
adequately instructed by other instructions on the doctrine of contributory negligence. However, we shall attempt to meet appellant on his own ground and show
that there is no merit to any of his arguments.
It is recognized in appellant's brief (page 32) that
the same state of facts may give rise to both the defenses
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. There
could of course, be no impropriety in instructing the jury
on both theories if the evidence warranted. It is further
pointed out in the plaintiff's brief that assumption of risk
involves a deliberate choice of a course of action with
full knowledge of the danger. We think there can be little
doubt that the conduct of the deceased amounted bo th to
1

contributory negligence and assumption of risk, and
certainly the evidence justified instructions on both defenses.
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Appellant argues that there is no evidence in the
record from which any reasonable inference can be drawn
that the deceased placed himself in a position of obvious
peril or that he deliberately incurred an obvious risk.
The record shows without dispute that the deceased
resided at 316 East 13th South Street and had resided
there for a number of years prior to the occurrence of
the fatal accident. He must, therefore, be presumed to
have known what the traffic conditions were on the· street
immediately in front of his residence. Certainly the jury
would be warranted in inferring that the deceased had
knowledge of these facts. There is also abundant evidence in the record that traffic along 13th South at the
time of day and place where the accident occurred was
generally heavy.
Mangum testified that he had to stop at the stop sign
at 3rd East Street, to allow traffic on 13th South to
clear. He also testified that it was necessary for him to
make a rather wide left hand turn on to 13th South Street
because the traffic was heavy.
The investigating police officers testified that traffic
along 13th South Street at that hour of the day was quite
heavy, and the· plaintiff's Exhibit E, which is a photograph taken shortly after the occurrence of the accident,
shows a heavy stream of traffic proceeding along 13th
South Street. Deceased must have known these facts;
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and he would be chargeable with the connnon knowledge
as to the danger of stepping from the safety of an auto~
mobile into a heavily traveled street without observing
to determine whether any traffic was approaching.
As said by the Supreme Court of Michigan in the
case of James v. Florios, 248 :Mich. 153, 226 N.W. 852:
.. "\Valking from behind and going beyond a
standing vehicle into a pathway open to traffic is
a fruitful source of accident and an ordinarily
prudent man will in view of the possible danger
in doing so, exercise the essential precaution of
ascertaining whether the way is open and may
reasonably be expected to remain open to his
crossing."

In Weaver v. Pickering, 279 Pa. 214, 123 Atl. 777,
the Court said:
"In the instant case plai.I1tiff seemed oblivious to danger and chose to walk by faith across
a busy city street; in so doing he assumed the
risk." (Italics ours.)
It is next argued by the appellant that the language
of the instruction placed upon the deceased a higher degree of care for his own safety than that of reasonable
care under the circumstances. In making this argument
appellant has apparently misconstrued the language of
the instruction. The first paragraph of the instruction
was taken almost verbatim from 38 Am. Jur., pp. 845-6,
Negligence, Sec. 171, and reads as follows :
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"One cannot deliberately incur an obvious
risk of personal injury, especially when preventive measures are at hand, and then hold the
author of the danger for the ensuing injury."
See also the sarne authority at page 859, Negligence
Sec. 182:
"A person who, by his own act, subjects himself unnecessarily to danger violate's the duty
imposed upon all men to use ordinary care for
their own safety and is guilty of contributory
negligence. The law imposes upon a person, sui
juris, the obligation to use ordinary care for his
own protection, the degree of which is commensurate with the dangers to be avoided; and one who
voluntarily and unnecessarily assumes a position
of danger, the hazards of which he understands
and appreciates, cannot recover for an rnJury
from a risk incident to the position."
We do not see how appellant can argue, with any
degree of logic, that this instruction is tantamount to a
directed verdict for the defendants. The language clearly
states that if the jury finds that the deceased placed
himself in a position of obvious peril and that there was
no reasonable justification therefor, then, in that event,
the deceased assumed the risk. Under the language of
the instruction, the jury was not bound to find that by
stepping from his automobile into the path of the defendants' approaching automobile, the deceased placed himself in obvious peril. The jury was merely permitted,
(not required) under the language of the instruction, so
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to find. Of course, in ad1nitting that the language of the
instruction, would permit the jury to find that the deceased did not place himself in a position of obvious
peril we do not adn1it that the evidence would have warranted a finding to that effect.
At the conclusion of his argument under Point I,
plaintiff cites a number of cases. We have carefully examined all of thes·e authorities and we do not see that
they are at all germane to the argument. In all of the
cases cited by the plaintiff the question presented to the
appellate Court was whethe·r there was sufficient evidence to warrant the submission to the jury of the issue
of the defendant's negligence or whether the evidence
showed that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. In none of the cases cited
by appellant is there any discussion of any instruction
in any wise similar to the instruction of which plaintiff
complains in the case at bar. The holdings of the various
courts in the cases cited by the plaintiff merely hold that
under the particular facts of those cases, that the evidence warranted a finding of negligence on the part orf
the defendant, or, that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, or both. In the'
instant case both the issues of defendants' negligence
and deceased's contributory negligence were submitted
to the jury, and decided adversely to the plaintiff. Appellant having had the benefit of a jury determination
of those issues, he is entitled to nothing more under the
holdings of his own authorities.
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It should also be observed here, that all of the
cases cited by appellant are quite different on their facts
from the case at bar. The most important difference
is the fact that in all of the cases cit~d by the plaintiff,
the evidence clearly showed that the plaintiff was in a
position along side the road for a sufficient length of
time that he could have been and should have been observed by the defendant. As has been pointed out in our
statement of facts, the evidence in the case at bar shows
without dispute that the deceased was not in a position
where he could have been observed by the defendants'
driver, but, on the contrary, that he stepped suddenly
and without warning from a place of safety directly
into the pathway of defendants' approaching vehicle.
We shall develop this point more fully under Point V
hereof. Suffice it at this time to quote from two or three
of the cases cited by appellant wherein the difference
between the two classes of cases is shown.
In Shannon v. Thomas (Cal. App.), 134 P. (2d) 522,
cited in appellant's brief, at page 26, the Court said:
"The situation here present is not akin to that
which exists where a pedestrian is about to cross
a street and thereby places himself in the path of
danger or suddenly steps out in front of and in
the path of an oncoming automobile or walks into
the street or upon a railway track without looking
at all as was the situation in several of the cases
relied upon by respondent."
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In Stephenson v. Parton, (Wa::;h.), 155 Pac. 147,
cited in plaintiff's brief, at page 23, the Court said:

••* * * If, a~ is contended by the appellants,
the deceased was in a place of safety, and stepped
in front of the autmnobile where there was no
chance to avoid being struck, the deceased was
guilty of negligence."
In Hadley v. Simpson, (\Vash.), 115 Pac. (2d) 675,
the difference was pointed out in the following language:
"The facts differentiate this case from such
cases as Hamblet v. Soderburg, 189 Wash. 449,
65 P. (2d) 1267, and Estill v. Berry, 193 \Vash. 10,
14 P. 2d 482, upon which respondent puts much
reliance. Decisions of which those are typical,
hold that a pedestrian is guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law (1) where he walks
into the side of an automobile which was in plain
sight at the time he said he looked and did not see
it;-(2) where, without looking he steps from behind a parked automobile or other object into the
path of an oncoming car."
The Court's Instruction No. 7 was based upon ample
evidence and correctly stated the law.
POINT II.
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 10.

For the convenience of this Court we set forth the
trial court's Instruction No. 10, which was as follows:
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"You are instructed that every person is
hound to. the exercise of vigilance with the view
to discovery of perils by which he may be menaced
and their avoidance after they are ascertained.
Every person is bound to use due diligence to
save his person from injury by the negligent act
of another.
"If you find from the evidence in this case
that the deceased, Arnold Kartchner, failed to
exercise vigilance to discover the approach of
traffic and particularly to discover the truck being
then and there operated by Montel Mangum and
that such failure to exercise vigilance was a proxinlate cause of the fatal injury sustained by the
said Arnold Kartchner, then your verdict must be
in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause of action."
It is apparently the position of appellant that the
language of this instruction placed upon the deceased
a highe·r duty of care than ordinary or reasonable care.
Appellant has apparently construed the word "vigilance"
to mean a degree of care higher than ordinary or reasonable care. Although the word "vigilance" has various
meanings, we do not believe that it can be construed
to me,an anything other than ordinary care, as used in
the language of the instruction, taken in its context and
in light of the other instructions of the Court. The word
is defined in the American College Dictionary, page 1356
as watchfulness. It is given the same definition in
Black's Law Dictionary at page 1817. The first paragraph of Instruction No. 10 was taken from 38 Am. Jur.,
page 865, Negligence Sec. 189, which reads as follows:
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'"Every person is bound to the exercise of
vigilance with a view to the discovery of perils
by which he may be menaced and their avoidance
after they have been a~certained. Every person
is bound to use due diligence to ~ave his person
from injury by the negligent act of another."
In Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, Vol. 1, pp.
249-250, it is stated that ordinary care implies the use of
such watchfulness and precaution to avoid coming into
danger and such effort to escape from or mitigate it when
actually in danger, as a person would ordinarily use for
his own protection under the same c] rcumstances.
A very similar case on this point is Mathews v.

Du.dley (Cal.), 297 Pac. 544. In that case the court instructed the jury with respect to a driver's duty as follows:
''You are instructed that a driver has no right
to assume that the road is clear, but under all
circumstances and at all times he must be vigilant
and must anticipate the presence of others. The
fact that he did not know that anyone was on the
highway is no excuse for conduct which would
have amounted to recklessness if he had known
that another vehicle or person was on the highway.
"I further instruct you that a person lawfully and carefully driving upon a highway has
the right to assume that all persons using the
highway will also use ordinary care and caution.
This rule allows drivers of motor vehicles to as-
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su1ne that 1notor vehicle drivers will obey and
abide by the traffic laws and regulations." (Italics
ours).
In holding that the word "vigilant" was synonymous

wit~

ordinary reasonable care, the Supreme Court

of California said:
"The gravamen of defendants' objection is
directed against the use of the word 'vigilant' in
the foregoing instruction, and counsel for the appellants quotes certain definitions of that word
as given in several dictionaries. The word, however, has numerous significances and synonyms,
depending upon the particular place and context
in which it is used and also to the subject to which
in its various uses it relates. One of the meanings
given to this word 'vigilant' is that contained in
the Century Dictionary, wherein it is defined as
'watchful, awake and on the alert; attentive to
discover and avoid danger, or to provide for
safety; circumspect; cautious; wary.' If each of
these synonyms of the word 'vigilant' has been
employed in the instruction complained of, it could
hardly, in respect to the duties of the drive,r of an
automobile upon the public highways, be said to
ha~e been erroneous. But, however that may be,
the instruction complained of has been approved
by the appellate tribunals of this state in anumber of decisions, some of which are the following:
Meyers v. Bradford, 54 Cal. App. 157, 201 P. 471;
Wright v. Salzberger, 81 Cal. App. 690, 701, 254
P. 671; Truitne,r v. Knight, 83 Cal. App. 655, 661,
257 P. 447; Alkus v. Davies, 86 Cal. App. 355, 260
P. 894; Rush v. Lagomarsino, 196 Cal. 308, 317,
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237 P. 1066, and Hatzakorzian v. Rucker-Fuller
Desk Co.. 197 Cal. 8:2, 99, 239 P. 709, 41 A.L.R.
10:27. \Ye discover no prejudicial error in the
giving or refusing to give any of the instructions
of which the appellants con1plain, nor any o:ther
error on the part of the trial court which would
warrant a reversal of this case.
''The judgment is affirmed."
This holding has been consistently followed by the
California Courts.

~ee

the recent case of Caselegno v.

Leonard, 105 Pac. (2d) 125, reviewing the decisions and
reaffirn1ing the doctrine.
In the case of City Ice and Fuel Co. v. Center, 54
Ohio Appeals 116, 6 N.E. (2d) 580, the trial court instructed the jury that the driver of a backing vehicle
should exercise "vigilance" not to injure those behind.
The instruction was in the language of a state statute.
On appeal the defendant contended that the statute was
unconstitutional as not laying down a definite standard
of care. The appellate Court held that the language of
the statute could only be interpreted to mean reasonable
care, which was a sufficiently definite standard. The
Court also quoted with approval from the above cited
case of Mathews v. Dudley;
The word "vigilance" was used by this court synonymously with "proper look-out" in Conklin v. Walsh (Ut.)
193 Pac. (2d) 437, 439.
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The Court's Instruction No. 10 must be read in conjunction with the Court's Instruction No. 1, whereby the
jury was instructed that the defendants relied upon contributory negligence as a defense ; Instruction No. 3
which defined contributory negligence as want of ordinary care; and Instruction No. 11 which

~dvised

the Jury

in effect that one negligent party could not recover
against another.
The use of the word "vigilance" in the Court's Instruction No. 10, did not have the effect of imposing upon
the deceased any higher duty than that of reasonable
care, nor of misleading the jury as to the degree of care
to which deceased should be held. The word "vigilance"
could not import anything other than ordinary care,
particularly when interpreted in the light of the Court's
other instructions and the generally accepted meaning
of the word.
At the conclusion of his argument under Point II,
appellant states that the cases cited under his Point I are
equally applicable to his Point· II. We can only say in
response, that they are equally inapplicable. All that was
said under our Point I with respect thereto, is applicable with the same force under this point. As previously
observed, appellant's cases do not involve the interpretations of any instructions.
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POINT III.
THE COU.RT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING TO THE
JURY THE QUESTION OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK ON
THE PART OF THE DECEASED.

As heretofore noted, appellant take the position under Point I of his argument, that the Court's Instruction
No. 7 was an instruction on contributory negligence. Under Point III of his argument appellant contends that
Instruction No. 7 was an instruction on assumption of
risk, and from this premise he argues that the Court
erred in giving the instruction for the reason that the
defendants did not plead in their answer the defense
of assumption of risk. Appellant then cites the general
rule that instructions to the jury should conform to the
issues presented by the pleadings and that ordinarily
it is error to instruct the jury on issues not raised by
the pleadings.
It shouid first be observed that in taking exception
to the Court's Instruction No. 7, the plaintiff did not
assign as one of the reasons therefor, the submission to
the jury of an issue not pleaded. Rule 51 U.R.C.P. provides as follows:
"No party may assign as error the giving or
the failure to give an i:p.struction unless he objects
thereto. In. objecting to the giving of an instruction the party must state distinctly the matter
to. which he objects and the grounds of his objection."
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The 1nanfiest purpose of this rule is to draw to the
attention of the trial court the particular grounds upon
which an instruction is claimed to be erroneous, and to
give the trial court an opportunity to correct any error
which may have been committed. Although appellant excepted to the giving of Instruction No. 7, he did not state
as one of his grounds therefor, that this instruction submitted to the jury an issue not raised by the pleadings.
For this reason appellant is now foreclosed from raising
the issue, and appellant's Point III is not entitled to be,
and should not be considered by this Court.
However, there was no error in the giving of this
instruction. While it is the general rule that the instructions of the trial court to the jury should be limited to
the issues made by the pleadings, there is a well recognized exception to this rule. Where evidence is received
without objection, or where the plaintiff.?.s evidence shows
that he is guilty of contributOry negligence or assumption
of risk, the other party is entitled to an instruction on
those matters, even though not pleaded. In other words,
the trial court may properly charge the jury as to matters
which at the trial are treated by both parties as being in
issue, and concerning which substantial evidence is introduced without objection_, although such matters may
have been insufficiently pleaded, or may not have been
pleaded at all. 53 A.m. Jur. 454, Trial, Sec. 576.
See also Johnson v. Gaughren (Wash.), 104 Pac.
170, where the Court said:
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"'The principal objections to the instructions
given are that they are not based on issues made
by the cmnplaint and answers, but it is a sufficient
answer to these objections to say that the instructions w·ere based on evidence admitted without
objection as if upon sufficient pleadings. In such
cases the court will tr~ril the pleadings as the parties themselves have treated them, as sufficiently
broad to warrant the introduction of the evidence."
See also Hoffman v. Southern Pac. (Cal. App.) 258
Pac. 397, where the Court said:
"As a general rule the contributory negligence of the plaintiff must be specially pleaded by
the defendant in order that he may rely upon this
defense. 19 Cal. J ur. 681, #104. But where
plaintiff's contributory negligence appears from
the allegations of his complaint or from the evidence introduced in his behalf, this plea is available to the defense, although it is not pleaded in
the answer. 19 Cal.. Jur. p. 681, #104, p. 697,
# 119; 20 R.C.L. 182, #151; 20 Standard Enc.
of Proc. 317; Green v. S. P. Co., 132 Cal. 254, 64 P.
255; Kenny v. Kennedy, 9 Cal. App. 350, 99 P.
384."
The purpose of requiring a defendant to plead an
affirmative defense is to give the plaintiff notice of what
the defendant will contend at the trial, so that he may
have adequate opportunity to meet the evidence. However, where, as in this case, the plaintiff's own evidence
shows conduct on his part which would prevent him from
recovering, it is not only proper to instruct on such
matters, but to fail to do so would be error.
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POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO GIVE
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 3, EITHER
IN THE LANGUAGE REQUESTED OR IN MODIFIED FORM.

For the convenience of the Court we set forth in full
the text of plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 3:
"If you believe from the evidence that the
deceased, Arnold G. Kartchner, was standing at
the left front door of his automobile or was in the
act of leaving or had just left his car by the said
left front door at the time of the accident, and
that said car was parked on or near the sidewalk
running in an easterly and westerly direction
on the south .side of 13th South, then the court
instructs you that the said Arnold G. Kartchner
was . in a place where he had a legal right to be,
and if you believe from the evidence, that he was
struck by defendants' truck at said time and place
and the·reby was injured and died as a result of
the injury, then the court instructs you that the
plaintiff in this case would have a right to recover
for the death of said Arnofd G. Kartchner in such
an amount as you shall find under all of the circumstances as may be just."
It require's no extended argument to show that this
request was wholly erroneous and was properly refused
by the Court. The request is tantamount to a directed
verdict for the plaintiff. All of the premises set forth in
the request were admitted or conclusively shown to be
facts at the trial. The evidence shows without dispute
that the deceased was in the act of leaving or had just
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left hi~ car by the left front door at the tin1e of the accident, that the car wa~ parked near the sidewalk in an
easterly and \H'sterly direction on the south side, of 13th
South; and that the deceased was struck by defendants'
truck and sustained fatal injuries. These facts all being
established, it would necessarily follow under the language of the request, that the plaintiff was entitled to
prevail. :Jloreoyer, in the language of the request there
is not even the slightest suggestion that the jury should
be required to find negligence imputable to the defendants, as a necessary prerequisite to a verdict for the
plaintiff, nor that such negligence upon the part of the
defendant was the cause of the accident. Neither is there
any suggestion that the plaintiff would be prevented
from recovering if the deceased were guilty of contributory negligence. The request is tantamount to saying
if you find that an accident occured the plaintiff has a
right to recover. We believe that no citation of authority
is required to show that this is not the law.
POINT V.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.

We believe that there was no error in the instructions of the trial Court, and that as a necessary consequence, the judgment of the trial Court should be
affirmed. If the Court is in agreement with us in this
view, there will be no occasion for the Court to consider
our argument under Point V. If, however, the Court is of
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the opinion that the trial court committed reversible
error in instructing the jury, it is our position that such
error would be immaterial, because the defendant was
entitled to a directed verdict under the evidence adduced.
(A) Plaintiff Failed to Sustain The Burden
of Proving That The Deceased's Fatal Injuries
Were Proximately Caused By Any Negligence
Upon the Part Of The Defendants.
It is a fundamental rule of law, too well established
to require citation of authority, that the plaintiff in a
personal injury action has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was
guilty of some act or omission constituting negligence,
and that such negligence was the proximate. cause of
the injury or death. See Whalen v. Mutrie, 247 Mass.
316, 142 N.E. 45, where it was held that in an action
for the death of a pedestrian struck by a motor truck,
the burden of proof to show defendant's negligence is on
the plaintiff, and such negligence cannot be inferred from
the mere happening of the accident.
It is the general rule that the driver of an automobile is not liable for injuries to a pedestrian received
when such pedestrian collides with the side of the automobile when alighting from another automobile or stepping suddenly from in front of or behind another automobile. A driver of an automobile is not bound to
anticipate that a pedestrian may suddenly run from
behind a parked automobile into his car or into the
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path of it, or do the same in alighting from a car, in
the absence of anything to put him on notice that such
an event is likely to occur. 5 Am. Jur. 610, 612, Automobiles, Sec. 191, 196.
As has been pointed out in our statement of facts,
the evidence in this case is clear and undisputed that
the deceased stepped suddenly from his parked station
wagon automobile directly into the side of the defendants' truck. The accident occurred almost simultaneously with deceased's alighting from his car. There is
no evidence in the record whatsoever to show that the
deceased had been standing at the side of his car for a
sufficient length of time to have been observed by the
defendants' driver. All of the evidence is to the contrary.
There were only three eye witnesses to the accident. The driver of defendants' truck, Mangum, testified that although he was looking straight ahead along
the road and observed the parked station wagon auto-mobile, he did not see any person standing in the. vicinity
of the station wagon. Keith Roberg, a nine year old boy
who was talking to the deceased immediately prior to
the occurrence of the accident, testified that as deceased
got out he was hit. His testimony quite clearly showed
that there was no substantial interval between the
moment that the deceased alighted from his station
wagon and the moment of impact. Ross Bradshaw, who
was driving westerly along 13th South Street and ap-
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proached the scene of the accident from the east, testified that he observed the deceased for less than a second
prior to the actual occurrence of the accident.
The evidence also shows quite conclusively that the
point of impact was on the side of the defendants' truck
and not on the front, and the testimony of the investigating police officers shows that the truck was moving away
from deceased's station wagon and toward the center
of the road at the point of impact.
The only evidence in the record, which in any wise
tends to indicate any negligence on the part of Mangum
is the testimony of Mrs. Roberg to the effect that a few
days after the occurrence~ of the accident, Mr. Mangum
sta~ed in her presence that he was looking down at the
seat at the time of the accident. But even if from this
shred of evidence the jury would be justified in finding
that the defendants' driver was guilty of negligence in
failing to keep a proper lookout, there is still no evidence
whatsoever that such negligence was the cause of the
accident. All of the facts and circumstances show quite
clearly that no matter how vigilant Mangum might have
been, he could not possibly have averted the accident.
The case of Chipokas v. Peterson, 219 Iowa 1072,
260 N.W. 37, is somewhat similar on its facts. There,
as here, it was contended by the plaintiff that the defendant failed to keep a proper lookout. In that case
the plaintiff, a child, ran either in front or in back of a
car parked along side the curb about one foot from the
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curb line. The defendant never did see the child who
ran suddenly and unexpectedly into the path of his
automobile.

Under these eircumstances the Supreme

Court of Iowa held that the plaintiff had failed to prove
negligence on the part of the defendant.
In Rittle v. Zeller, 100 Pa. Super. Ct. 516, the Court
said:
"Our courts have repeatedly and consistently
held that drivers of autos cannot be expected
to anticipate the sudden appearance of a child
from behind an automobile or some similar obstruction to view."
For other cases to the same effect see :
McAteer v. Highland Coffee Co., 291 Pa. 32,
139 A. 585;
Grein v. Gordon, 280 Pa. 576, 124 A. 737;
Monroe v. Eager, 16 La. App. 540, 131 So.
719;
Rodriquez v. Abadie (La. App.), 168 So. 515;
Sundbery v. Ber (La. App.), 162 So. 85;
Watson v. Home Mut. Ins. Assoc., 215 Ia. 670,
246 N.W. 655;
Messick v. Mason, 156 Va. 193, 157 S.E. 575;
Howk v. Anderson, 218 Ia. 358, 253 N.W. 32;
Crutchley v. Bruce, 214 Ia. 731, 240 N.W. 238;
Klink v. Bany (Ia.), 224 N.W. 540;
Bishard v. Engelbeck, 180 Ia. 1132, 164 N.W.
203.
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(B) The Plaintiff Was Guilty of Contributory Negligence As A Matter Of Law.
It is well settled that a pedestrian who suddenly
steps into the street from behind a standing automobile;
immediately in front of a car being driven along the
highway is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law and is not entitled to recover for the resulting
injuries. The rule is, of course, the same where a
pedestrian steps into the pathway of an approaching
vehicle from inside a parked vehicle. The basis of the
rule is that the plaintiff has failed to exercise a proper
lookout for his own safety. 1 Shearman & Redfield on
Negligence, 324; 5 Am. J ur. 610, 764, Automobiles, ##
191, 462.
The cases in support of the rule are legion. As illustrative, we quote below from a few of the cases on this
point:

Standard Oil of Kentucky v. Noakes, 59 Fed. 2nd,

897:
. "There can be no doubt that one who crosses
a street between intersections and from behind a
parked car, which not only obstructs his view but
also the view of drivers of approaching cars, is
under a duty to look in the direction from which
danger may be expected, and the failure to do
so is negligence which will defeat recovery if
accident results. This must be so if reason and
common sense are to be applied in measuring
human conduct, and if experience and observa-
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tion are of aid to judgment. 'Walking frmn
behind and going beyond a standing vehicle into
a pathway open to traffic is a fruitful source of
accident.' J runes vs. Florios, 248 Mich. 153, 226
N.\V. ~5~, ~53. 'The time has come when ordinary
care requires a pedestrian to look for approaching automobiles before he leaves the zone of
safety.' :Mertens v. Lake Shore Yellow Cab &
Transfer Co., 195 Wis. 646, 218 N.W. 85, 86."

Dando v. Brobst, 318 Pa. 325, 177 A. 831:
"The accident occurred about one o'clock in
the afternoon of a dry day, and it is not claimed
that plaintiff's vision was in any way obscured.
Under these circumstances, plaintiff must inevitably have seen the car if she had looked, and
if she saw nothing she could not have been looking. As we have repeatedly pointed out it is vain
for a person to say he looked when, in spite of
what his eyes have told him, he moved into the
path of an approaching car or train by which he
was immediately struck.
"The duty to look rests at all times upon
everyone in the use of streets * * * [citations
omitted] * * * and when one steps into a busy
street and is immediately struck by a passing
vehicle which he could have seen had he looked, he
is barred by his own negligence * * * [citations
omitted].
"In any case, however, plaintiff was under a
duty to look before stepping into the street, and
since the 'incontrovertible physical facts' show
that the car was almost upon her when she stepped from the curb and that she would certainly
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have seen it if she had looked, it is plain that
she must have failed to look. Her own negligence
* * * bars her recovery." (Italics ours).
The above case was quoted with approval in Covaleskie v. Schimpf, 322 Pa. 65, 185 A. 196.
Woods v. Moore (Mo. App.), 48 S.W. 2nd 202:
"Not to see what is plainly visible when there
is a duty to look constitutes negligence. If, on the
other hand, as all the defendant's witnesses
testified, plaintiff did not look at any time, until
just before he was struck, when there was a duty
imposed upon him to look, he was likewise guilty
of negligence."
Matassa v. Economy Cab Co. (La. App.), 158 So.
239:
"* * * we are satisfied that plaintiff had the
sante opportunity of seeing the cab that its driver
had of seeing plaintiff; * * * that the proximate
cause of the accident was the negligence of plaintiff in passing behind the bakery truck into the
line of the approaching cab so close to it that the
driver could not see him in time to give warning
or to avoid striking him; * * *" (Italics ours).

Woods v. Pace, 220 App. Div. 386, 222 N.Y.S. 157:
"If it could be argued that the defendant
ought to have seen plaintiff in this place, where
pedestrians were not expected- to be, how can the
plaintiff be excused from seeing the automobile
where west bound traffic would be expected to be.
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If a jury could find that defendant should have
seen tli.e plaintiff and avoided hitting him, it must
likewise find that the plaintiff should have seen
the defendant'~ auton1obile and avoided being
hit."
Hamblet c. Soderbttrg, 189 \Vash. 449, 65 Pac.
(2d) 1267, 1269:

"Present-day traffic upon our streets and
highways is of such a nature that the duty of
reasonable care, which rests upon all, requires
in aln1ost any conceivable situation, a fairly efficient attempt at observation before a pedestrian
steps into the path of vehicular traffic.
"Where, as here, no attempt at observation
is made and especially where one steps out from
behind an obscuring object, the pedestrian is
guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
"This conclusion seems to be self evident, but
reference may be had to the following of our
cases which, in principle at least, sustain our
present holding: Jones v. Seattle, 144 Wash. 188,
257 P. 393; Gottstein v. Daly, 166 Wash. 582,
7 P. (2d) 610.
"Even had there been testimony that Mrs.
Hamblet had looked but did not see the approaching automobile, still there could have been no
recoyery. Silverstein v. Adams, 134 Wash. 430,
235 P. 784; Steinheim v. Nicholas, 171 Wash.
614, 18 P. (2d) 836."
In Chase v. Thomas (Cal. App.), 46 Pac. (2d) 200,
201, the Court, holding plaintiff guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law, observed:
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"It appears from the evidence that plaintiff
had gone to the rear of his truck, where he took
out a laundry bag, closed the doors, and stepped
further into the street toward the north. He
testified that he was not more than a foot or 18
inches from the fender of his truck at the time
he was struck by the automobile, which was traveling east."
A case strikingly similar in point of fact to the case
at bar is Will v. Boston Elevated Railroad Co., 247
Mass. 250, 142 N.E. 44. In that case the plaintiff was
a guest passenger in the rear seat of an automobile.
The driver of the car stopped the automobile on the right
hand side of the street and as close to the edge of the
street as he could get. The plaintiff opened the door on
the left side of the automobile, and, as he was getting
out, a trolley car approaching from the rear struck the
automobile on the left hand side and injured the plaintiff. The street was straight for a distance of some 400
feet to the rear of the parked automobile. The court
held the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as
a matter of law.
The Court said in that case,:
"There was no evidence to support a finding
of due care on the part of the plaintiff. His own
testimony was that he alighted from the automobile into the pathway of the trolley car, without looking to see if any car was coming; that
he did not hear or see the car or know anything
about it until it struck him. His view was un-
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ob~tructed * * * It is manifest that the slightest
attention to his own safety would have prevented
his injury. While he might depend to a reasonable extent on the expectation that the motorUlan would not be negligent, he was not justified
in abandoning all precautions for self protection.
• • • It does not appear that the plaintiff had any
knowledge of the precise position of the autoInobile with reference to the trolley car or relied
upon it in any degree. The plaintiff was in a
place of entire safety withi.n the automobile. He.
voluntarily and without exigency moved into a
danger .zone by getting in front of an oncoming
trolley car, which must have been in plain sight
and very near when he opened the door of the
automobile and got out." (Italics ours).

The doctrine of the above case was reaffirmed in
the recent case of Woodward v. City (Mass.), 76 N.E.
(2d) 656.
A case citing and discussing many of the authorities
on this question, which we commend to the Court, is
Cooper & Co. v. American Can Co., 130 Me. 76, 153 Atl.
889.
Although the case of Mingus v. Olsson (S. Ct. of Ut.
1949), 201 Pac. (2d) 495, is not precisely similar on its
facts to the case at bar the language used by the Court
in that case is similar to that used by other courts and
is appropriate here:
Justice Wolfe, speaking for the Court, said at pages
498-9:
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".More convmCing than tne direct testimony
that deceased did not look, is the further evidence that deceased neither said nor did anything to indicate that he was at all aware of the
danger presented by defendant's approaching
auton1obile. He seems to have been wholly unaware of its approach. Certainly he did nothing
either to warn his wife, nor to rescue either himself or her from their position of peril. On this
evidence, it must be said as a matter of law that
deceased either failed to look, or having looked,
failed to see what he should have seen.
"There can be no doubt that a pedestrian
who undertakes to cross a busy street of a large
city, without first observing for vehicular traffic
is guilty of contributory n~gligence. * * * A
pedestrian crossing a public street in a crosswalk
or pedestrian lane, although he may have the right
of way over vehicular traffic, nonetheless has the
duty to observe for such traffic. Clearly, decedent
neglected that duty in this case. It follows that
he was contributorily negligent as a matter of
law. Of course we do not mean to imply that a
mere glance in the direction of the approaching
automobile would suffice. The duty to look has
inherent in it the duty to see what is there to be
seen, and to pay heed to it."
See also the language in the concurring op1n1on
of Mr. Justice Wade at page 499 :
"I agree that under the evidence here, decedent was guilty of contributory negligence as
a matter of law, because the evidence shows that
he walked directly into the course of an approaching autmnobile without taking any precaution
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to prevent being struck thereby, since the auto~
n1obile had its headlights lighted so that he could
haYe seen it approaching and waited in a place
of safety and thereby avoided the accident. Even
had decedent looked to see if there was an autonwbile approaching, this would not have exonerated hun frmn negligence. As long as he walked
direetly into the course of an approaching automobile without taking any precaution for his
safety, it would 1nake no difference whether he
looked or failed to look for approaching traffic.
If he looked and inattentively failed to see the
approaching car or absentmindedly failed to
realize his danger, or he realized his danger but
still continued on into the course of the car, he
would be in the same situation as to contributory
negligence as though he failed to look at all."
For other cases, illustrative of the proposition that
a plaintiff who steps suddenly from a concealed position, imrnediately in front of an approaching car is
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, we
invite the Court's attention to the following cases on
this point:
Dobrowolski v. Henderson, 15 La. App. 79,
130 So. 237;
Stawsky v. Wheaton, 220 Ia. 981, 263 N.W.

313;
McAteer v. Highland Coffee Co., 291 Pa. 32,
139 A. 585;
Pierce v. Hosrnan, 201 Ky. 278, 256 S.W. 397;
Deal v. Snyder, 203 Mich. 273, 168 N.W. 973;
Letts v. Cole, 310 Pa. 509, 165 A. 847;
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Ko0ck v. Goodnight (Tex. Civ. App.), 71 S.W.
(2d) 927;
Jarvis v. Stone, 216 Ia. 27, 247 N.W. 393;
Runge v. Haller, 236 Ky. 423, 33 S.W. (2d)
317;
Pettijohn v. Weede (Ia.), 227 N.W. 824;
Hayes v. Gunter Bros. Lumber Co., 14 La.
A pp. 402, 129 So. 401 ;
Hughes v. Torregrossa, 278 :Mass. 530, 180
N.E. 304;
1\faranta v. vYenzelberg, 241 App. Div. 420,
272 N.Y.S. 710; Affd. 267 N.Y. 510, 196
N.E. 554;
Ponder v. Carroll, 193 Ark. 1120, 105 S.W.
(2d) 72;
Beaucage v. Roak, 130 Me. 114, 153 A. 894;
Rittle v. Zeller, 100 Pa. Super. Ct. 516;
James v. Florios, 248 Mich. 153, 226 N.,V. 852;
Mertens v. Lake Shore Yellow Cab & Transfer
Co., 195 Wis. 646, 218 N."\V. 85;
Harder v. Matthews, 67 Wash. 487, 121 Pac.
983;
Weaver v. Pickering, 279 Pa. 214, 123 A. 777;
Conrad v. Green (N.J. Sup.), 94 A. 390;
Fulton v. Mohr, 200 Mich. 538, 166 N.W. 851;
Di Stephano v. Smith (R.I.), 102 A. 817;
Owens v. Tisdale (La. App.), 153 So. 564.
The plaintiff has effectually admitted contributory
negligence on the part of the deceased in his own brief.
At page 17 of plaintiff's brief it is said: "There is not
a word of evidence to show th~t the deceased either
knew the truck was approaching the parking area or
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that it was coming toward his position." We are· constrained to agree with this state1nent. In fact we might
go further and say the eYidence quite clearly shows that
the deceased did not know of the immediate approach
of the defendants' truck, notwithstanding there was
nothing obstructing his vision and that the most casual
glance to his rear would have revealed the danger.
Appellant says further (also at page 17), "It is undoubtedly true that it would have been safer for the deceased
to haYe gotten out of the right hand side of his car.
* * *" It is well settled that where a person has a choice

of methods of doing an act which are equally available,
he is deemed negligent if he selects the more dangerous
of the methods, in the absence of any showing of the
existence of an emergency, sudden peril or other circumstances justifying such choice. 38 Am. Jur., Negligence Sec. 193; Raymond v. U. P.R. Co. (Ut.), 191 Pac.
(2d) 137.
Again on page 18 of appellant's brief, he states
that there is nothing to indicate that when the deceased
got out of his car that he knew the bread truck was
going to strike him down. In Vol. 1, Shearman & Redfield

on Negligence, 242, ~t is said:
"It is not enough that the plaintiff should
act prudently in view of the knowledge which he
actually had. He is responsible for his ignorance
of that which he ought to have known."
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CONCLUSION
The trial court committed no error in its instructions
to the jury. The plaintiff failed to sustain the burden
of proving that the defendants were guilty of negligence
which was the proximate cause of the accident; and the
deceased's own contributory negligence was the proximate cause of his death. The judgment of the trial court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

MORETON, CHRISTENSEN &
CHRISTENSEN,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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